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The ‘politicisation’ of Englishness – towards a framework for political analysis 
Introduction 
The constitutional position of England has become the subject of intense focus following the 
decision by the Conservative Party to table the question of English devolution in the 
immediate aftermath of the Scottish Referendum, in September 2014. The debates that broke 
out about whether this implied reforms to the legislative process – either in the form of some 
version of ‘English Votes for English Laws’ (EVEL), or more radical solutions, such as an 
English Parliament – or should be advanced through the decentralisation of powers within 
England by passing powers to major cities and city regions – spilled into the general election 
campaign of 2015. Arguments about governance and constitution were then subsumed 
beneath the decision of the Conservatives to highlight the prospect of a Labour-led 
administration which might involve some sort of arrangement with an ascendant Scottish 
National Party. The concerted attempt to scare English voters about this prospect provided a 
new prism for discourse on the English Question, and may have played a role in determining 
the intentions of some voters.i More generally, as a result of these twin developments, 
numerous pundits have argued that English nationalism has become a major factor in British 
politics, and a source of deepening territorial tension (White 2015).  
Academic commentators have been slower to interrogate the nature and implications of these 
assertions, and, despite the ubiquity of references to English interests and anxieties in public 
discourse, there is a much less extensive analytical literature on the make-up and political 
dimensions of the national identity of the largest people of the UK (approximately 84% of its 
total population) compared to the considerable body of work devoted to its various national 
counterparts in the UK. Indeed, the very idea of holding up England or Englishness as objects 
for intellectual interrogation still remains a rather alien enterprise in the study of British 
politics (Kenny 2014a). This special issue, which I have edited with Andrew Mycock and 
Ben Wellings, represents an attempt to address this critical deficit,ii and includes papers 
which raise interpretive, historical and empirical questions about the emergence of a ‘political 
Englishness’.  
How, then, should the political status and character of the English identity be understood and 
studied? Projections of a political, or politicised, Englishness, I will argue, typically rest upon 
a number of foundational, and often contentious, judgements of both interpretive and 
empirical kinds. This article highlights the different ways in which ‘politicisation’ in this 
context has been characterised, and shows that each of these established perspectives points 
towards a very different sort of political response and policy approach.  I finish with some 
observations about how politicisation might be better conceptualised, and identify the 
elements of a more comprehensive and fluid understanding of this phenomenon. 
 
Political Englishness – a typology 
There are four main characterisations of  political Englishness circulating in contemporary 
debate. And while these are certainly not mutually exclusive, and are often combined in 
particular arguments, each represents a distinct way of understanding Englishness and the 
nature of its entry into the domain of politics.  
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1. Political allegiance 
It is often suggested that a propensity to identify with an English nationality either reflects an 
established ideological predisposition or encourages certain kinds of political allegiance 
among citizens. This notion reflects the widely held view that Englishness represents a 
national consciousness that is fundamentally regressive, nostalgic and anti-modern in its 
character, the antithesis of those forms of modern nationalism that have cohered around the 
values of popular sovereignty and equality. According to senior Labour politician Jack Straw, 
English nationalism represented the dark side of the national character, with its ‘… 
propensity to violence’ and ‘… history of subjugating other peoples’. The expression of an 
English identity is, accordingly, often held to be a natural expression of, or route to, a 
conservative political temperament – or, latterly, closely associated with the populist 
nationalism associated with UKIP (Seth Smith, 2015).   
This longstanding claim can be traced to various intellectual and political sources, and 
reflects, in particular, the liberal embrace of a post-imperial civic Britishness, during the latter 
years of the twentieth century, and a  rejection of the post-imperial connotations of ‘little 
Englandism’. A key influence upon this characterisation was the work of New Left, and 
latterly nationalist, theoretician Tom Nairn (1977). He depicted English nationalism as the 
symptom of a stalled consciousness exhibited by a people bewitched by the aura of the 
ancient British state, and its ‘enchanting’ institutions (2011).  When the English did express 
their national identity in political terms, Nairn contended, they did so in regressive, nostalgic 
fashion, lacking an underpinning notion of popular sovereignty. During the New Labour 
years he argued that a new spasm of English nationalism was inevitable, and was likely to 
find expression in populist and xenophobic terms (2000). 
Many on the left disagreed with Nairn over the viability and importance of Britishness – 
which was loudly promoted by New Labour figures in the late 1990s and 2000s - but most 
tended to recycle his aversion to an English nationality. Gordon Brown’s progressive British 
patriotism was in part premised upon the assumption that this was a viable container for the 
atavism and conservatism that subsisted within English culture. More generally, English 
nationalism was routinely referenced as a source of conservative sentiments that might well 
endanger the multi-cultural union or divert attention from the underlying material inequalities 
which Labour’s ought to be addressing (Brown 2014; Jones 2012). 
Yet there are, in both empirical and interpretive terms, good reasons to doubt the adequacy of 
these perspectives upon English national identity, and the intellectual foundations upon which 
they rest. Nairn’s arguments have long been challenged for the reified and essentialist 
account of the English tradition which he, and other left intellectuals, advanced in the post-
war decades. Historical critics like E.P.Thompson (1965) pointed to the variety of forms of 
collective action and political endeavour that were formed from the materials that Nairn and 
other critics dismissed as irredeemably regressive (Kenny, 2014b). They observed the 
enduring power of the idea of the ‘freeborn Englishman’, the potent idea of an unfolding 
tradition of English liberty, and the continuing presence of radical claims upon an English 
political heritage. The neo-marxist insensitivity to the multiple political articulations of an 
English identity reflects an ingrained tendency – still apparent in much commentary – to 
conceive of English nationhood in an essentialist, rather than contested, fashion. 
These interpretive objections are supported by empirical evidence which undermines standard 
assumptions about the relationship between political allegiance and English identification. 
Looking across the body of polling conducted since devolution was introduced, there is 
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surprisingly little evidence to support firm judgements about the politically Conservative or 
populist implications of English allegiance. It is only in the very recent past that any kind of 
significant correlation is apparent at the level of individual attitudes (see Wyn Jones et al. 
2012; Wyn Jones et al. 2013).  But, rather than reflecting a deep-rooted relationship, these 
findings may well relate to contingent factors such as the rise of UKIP, the advent of the 
Scottish Referendum in 2014, or growing resentment at the economic position of London and 
the South East region. These surveys also report that supporters of all the main parties are – 
with the exception of the Lib Dems – inclined to see themselves as English and British if 
given the choice, though the rising number who do identify as solely or predominantly 
English is notable.  Survey evidence tends to suggest that geography matters more than 
ideology in relation to English allegiance, with those living outside London similarly inclined 
to identity with Englishness, and London being a notable outlier, with higher levels of 
attachment to Britishness still prevailing.  
While the rise of UKIP and the territorial character of its appeal may provide some support 
for this residual perception of Englishness, the contention that this is an inherently 
conservative form of nationalism is much harder to sustain in empirical terms than is widely 
assumed.  
2) A political question? 
A second, distinct way of understanding political Englishness emanates from those who 
perceive the English Question as a constitutional, rather than popular, issue. Within this 
interpretation, questions about the national sentiments and constitutional rights of the people 
remain secondary to the decisions taken by political parties and individuals about whether to 
bring it onto the main political stage.  
For many critics, David Cameron’s response to the announcement of the Scottish 
Referendum result on 19 September 2014 was an attempt to secure party advantage on an 
issue where the Conservatives perceived their main opponents at Westminster as uncertain 
and defensive, and which offered the prospect of shoring up the party’s support in the face of 
the UKIP threat. And yet, to define the politics of Englishness solely, or primarily, as a newly 
politicised issue-area has considerable limitations. First, it underplays the extent to which the 
English question has long served as an important auxiliary to debates about devolution that 
have unfolded since Labour introduced it in the last 1990s, and became a regular fixture in 
constitutional discussions from the 1970s onwards. The asymmetry of the Union, the absence 
of any kind of devolution for England, and the potential imbalances which Labour’s 
settlement introduced, all featured prominently in the arguments of the late 1990s, and were a 
key backdrop to the justification of Labour’s regional government agenda (and the opposition 
to it) thereafter. Ideas and arguments about the English question were an inseparable part of 
debates about constitution and governance in the UK. The notion that David Cameron single-
handedly and illegitimately injected this issue into British politics, therefore, defies historical 
credibility. 
And it is belied too by the upsurge of interest in questions of nationhood and territory which 
have been apparent for some while in British politics. During the second Blair administration 
the West Lothian question became a source of considerable focus within public discourse, as 
several controversial pieces of Labour’s legislative programme were passed against the 
wishes of most English MPs, notably legislation involving University tuition fees and 
Foundation Hospitals. Indeed a number of different scholars have identified the mid 2000s as 
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the point when a significant shift towards a more resentful and anxious national mood may 
have gained a foothold. 
The notion that the Conservatives stoked English nationalism for political gain affords a 
degree of agency to a political party which is unlikely, and rests on normative assumptions 
about the illegitimacy of political engagements with national sentiment, which merit critical 
examination. In fact, an appreciation of the hinterland of debates associated with devolution 
suggests instead that, for the most part, the UK party system responded slowly and reluctantly 
to an issue that was of growing concern to many English voters.  
3) Englishness – from cultural to political nationalism?  
This observation also hints at a different way of understanding the emergence of a politicised 
Englishness. This perspective draws attention to a potentially fundamental shift within the 
character of English national consciousness, and depicts politicisation in terms of the 
purported advent of a mass English nationalism. This, it is suggested, has grown out of what 
was once a stable, primarily cultural, vein of patriotism. Some researchers indeed suggest that 
the English are beginning to envisage their own national-political community as disaffection 
grows with the terms of the union (Wyn Jones et al., 2012).  
One further implication of this position is that ‘politicisation’ arises from the emergence of a 
sense of shared interest and common concern among the English peoples, and a concomitant 
desire to see this commonality accorded some degree of representation and recognition within 
the political and institutional structures of the state. Such a characterisation weighs against 
familiar arguments in favour of a system of regional government as the most appropriate 
equivalent of the devolution of powers to non-English territories, and highlights the national 
character of demands for devolution which are unlikely to be satiated by the establishment of 
more powerful cities and city-regions (Tombs, 2015). 
This way of understanding the politicisation of an English national identity has been widely 
echoed in media and academic commentary. It figured in the final report of the McKay 
Commission which reported in March 2013 on the implications of devolution for legislation 
in the Lower House that affected England only (McKay 2013), and in David Cameron’s 
response to the Scottish Referendum result, where he spoke of growing English demand for 
‘voice’, and promised to find an answer to the West Lothian Question. But it also needs more 
careful evaluation, and rests upon assumptions that are by no means unproblematic. The 
notion of a substantive shift in English consciousness, from a cultural to a political modality, 
implies that national consciousness in the preceding period was not significantly political. 
Yet, as Arthur Aughey and Andrew Gamble show, in their different contributions to this 
special issue, ‘England’ carried a distinctive set of constitutional and political connotations 
until the early decades of the twentieth century, being closely associated with the ideas of 
parliamentary government and the pursuit of liberty. Notions of the ‘character’ of this people 
were, as historian Peter Mandler (2007) has demonstrated, typically understood in 
civilisational terms, rather than those of ethnicity or culture.  
In his major recent study of the history of the national self-image of the English,  Robert 
Tombs (2014) explores the array of unions and alliances into which the English people have 
been inserted by their rulers, experiences that have bequeathed a dispensation to distance 
from nationalist forms of expression and a self-image as a mixed people who have mostly 
been accepting of the compromises required to keep these unions operative, but have also 
been wary of arrangements that jeopardise their own interests. From this perspective, recent 
signs of irritation and territorial grievance might be read not as a burgeoning nationalist 
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desire to overthrow the Unions through which England is governed, but as a reflection of the 
established intuition that the English are reluctant to consent to constitutional arrangements 
which appear to compromise the basic principle of fair treatment for nations within a union. 
The notion of the sudden onset of a political nationalism among the English people is reliant 
upon a weak sense of historical memory, and typically understates the intertwining of cultural 
and political purposes and resonances that lie at the heart of different notions of Englishness, 
and indeed of nationalism generally. There is, moreover, considerable evidence to suggest 
that there is far more continuity within the English mind-set, on issues relating to sovereignty 
and constitution, than much current commentary allows. For instance, the most rigorous 
polling repeatedly shows that a majority of people retain a residual attachment to the UK, and 
indeed continue to identify as British, as well as feeling an affinity for a newly emerging 
English community (Ormston 2012). This represents a considerable challenge to the 
proposition that political nationalism among the English signals the rejection of the ethos and 
values of liberal Britain.  
The habit of seeing Britishness on the one hand, and sub-state forms of national and regional 
consciousness on the other, as irreconcilable alternatives has long been questioned. As some 
of the shrewdest observers of nation and constitution – for instance Bernard Crick (1993) –   
have long observed, one of the defining features of Britishness is its capacity to overarch, and 
leave room for, a range of different cultural and national identities and traditions. It may well 
be that what is happening in popular terms involves the re-formation of British identity, in an 
era of heightened national and territorial consciousness, rather than its linear decline.  
4)  After empire?  
There is a fourth, distinct understanding of politicisation which also deserves more careful 
consideration. It stems from critical arguments that are less familiar to political science (for 
an exception see: Gifford 2014) but are highly influential in other social scientific fields, and 
are reflected in left-wing political circles. On this view, it is the trauma associated with the 
abandonment of empire, and the inability of the UK’s elites to deal with the external 
challenges associated with post-imperial decline, that have played a key role, freezing the 
national consciousness of the English into a kind of cultural melancholia and an endless 
lament for a global status and social order that no longer prevail (Gilroy 2004). This 
backward-looking, parochial nationalism is encapsulated in the cultural obsession with the 
Second World War.  
On this view, political Englishness signals a deepening desire - triggered by the conditions of 
uncertainty and decline associated with relative economic decline,  European integration and, 
latterly, devolution – to retreat to a  cultural formation that offers an imaginative solace from 
the anxieties generated by these powerful dynamics (Schofield 2013). Various commentators, 
in the wake of Nairn, have long anticipated the likely emergence of populist, resentment-
driven nationalism as a vehicle for the self-assertion of working-class voters who have 
become decreasingly loyal to mainstream political parties. 
Many advocates of the post-imperial thesis also adhere to the notion that, by dint of the 
unique historical circumstances in which it emanated, Englishness cannot be seen as the 
stable emanation from a rich and rooted tradition. It is instead a kind of void, an empty vessel 
filled with regressive, pastoral fantasies. English nationalism was infected by the 
universalising mentality of the British empire, and was also, according to historical 
sociologist Krishan Kumar (1999), significantly restrained and depleted by the imperative to 
establish an overarching British national identity for the peoples of the UK.  
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What distinguishes the post-imperial decline thesis is the conviction that the English will only 
come to terms with their own history as a former imperium when they embrace the kind of 
civic, post-national patriotism which progressive thinkers advocated in the final years of the 
twentieth century. But the notion that a politicised Englishness represents a stew of 
reactionary and xenophobic fantasies is challenged, for instance, by qualitative research that 
points to the multiple kinds of belonging and different forms of imagined community that a 
sense of English belonging conveys (Skey 2010). It is also, importantly, confounded by 
evidence of shifts in the ways in which a growing number of citizens from minority 
backgrounds relate to an English, as well as British, identity (Kenny 2014a, pp.100-105). 
Throughout the last two decades most polls have consistently shown that, at an aggregate 
level, most members of minority communities choose to identify as British, and are wary of  
Englishness. Yet, in recent years, various studies have shown that in its everyday contexts, 
this form of sentiment is much more ethnically and culturally porous than is typically 
imagined (Skey 2010) - though most research agrees that Muslims typically remain excluded 
from its terms of belonging (Mann 2011).  
But perhaps the most important reason for doubting the post-imperial decline thesis is its 
foundational assumption that, in giving up its empire and losing its dominant power status, 
the UK has experienced the same degree and kind of psychic trauma and cultural fall-out that 
have beset other states that were once imperial hegemons. In fact, as the passage of time 
permits us to take an ever longer view of this process, there are good reasons to query 
whether this axiom is well founded. There is, for instance, a growing debate among historians 
about the adequacy of this reading of post-war Britain (Howe 2013).  Equally, the contention 
of some political economists (Gamble 1994) that the UK’s relatively open economy ensured 
a smoother transition from empire than that experienced by other states, is also pertinent here, 
suggesting one important reason why a strong sense of continuity with the past has been a 
hallmark of English nationhood. 
Indeed, while the question of geo-political role has posed a major dilemma for the UK’s elites, 
which have disagreed about where to position this state in relation to Europe and the US 
(Gamble 2003), in other respects the UK appears to have made the adjustment to a post-
imperial status in a more stable and successful way than some of its comparators. There is 
relatively little evidence to suggest that the post-imperial syndrome has been the only 
dynamic shaping the trajectory of identity politics within England and the approach that the 
UK has taken to issues of cultural diversity and integration.  
This is not to suggest the downplaying of empire, and the multiple effects its passing has had 
in high politics and popular consciousness. But it is to commend that we seek a proportionate, 
non-deterministic, understanding of their causal role at the level of national identity, and 
appreciate the degree to which the refashioning of different territorial identities in different 
parts of the UK is a response to other, pressing developments and pressures. 
Implications for policy 
This typology incorporates the main, rival ways of understanding and accounting for the 
politicisation of Englishness. Some of these perspectives undoubtedly overlap, even though 
each rests upon a quite distinct form of historical understanding and definition of what 
politicisation actually entails. The chief analytical value of identifying their assumptions and 
implication is to enable a more reflective and critical debate about the normative and 
empirical assumptions informing discourse on contemporary Englishness. But there is 
another reason for elucidating the distinctive character of these perspectives. Each carries 
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important consequences for policy and politics. And, as the potential for conflict over the 
English question grows in British politics, the dilemmas associated with them will become 
increasingly important. 
If, firstly, the political character of Englishness lies in relation to the  attitudes and allegiances 
this form of nationhood promotes or reveals, political actors will, very likely, be inclined to 
respond in primarily, or solely, partisan terms. Specifically, if non-Conservative politicians 
believe – as many do – that those who identify strongly with Englishness are by definition 
unlikely to be their supporters, this increases the likelihood that they will continue to ignore 
or play down the English Question. Taking this view may also lead parties, for instance the 
Lib Dems and Labour since the late 1990s, to promote the merits of decentralisation to tiers 
of governance which reflect attachments – to locality, city or region – that they view more 
positively. This is undoubtedly one reason why the dream of a regional tier government 
remains alive in high political circles despite its palpable lack of popularity among the 
populace at large. 
If, however, politicisation is taken to signal the sudden emergence into the political spotlight 
of an issue-area that has long remained in the shadows of British politics – as the second 
perspective considered here suggests a very different kind of political response may well 
become apposite. In strategic terms, the parties will calculate whether this is an issue that it is 
in their interest to keep at the heart of political debate, and will accordingly make decisions 
about whether to depoliticise, dilute or maintain its prominence. Responses formed in this 
way are unlikely to leave space for consideration of the deeper-lying, and longer term, shifts 
in national identification and sentiment that are associated with this issue, and may well leave 
the parties open to the accusation that they are prioritising their own  partisan interests over 
the good of the wider community. The government’s attempt to promote a particular answer 
to the West Lothian question as a sufficient answer to the English question may well fit this 
bill, and so too, perhaps, calls for a constitutional convention offered by the Labour and Lib 
Dem parties since September 2014. 
But if – as - the third perspective considered above stipulates – Englishness has altered its 
internal character from being a predominantly cultural form of nationhood to becoming a 
species of mass nationalism, very different kinds of policy response would seem to be 
required. This kind of analysis gives succour to those who argue for a substantive form of 
EVEL in order to give the English a voice and to head off a growing sense of grievance. As 
has been widely noted, however, such a reform is extremely difficult to introduce into the UK 
parliament and may well introduce new territorial tensions into the Union.  
But there is another important implication of this kind of interpretation. The notion that 
political nationalism has grown from what was once a ‘merely cultural’ nationhood implies 
that cultural questions have been surpassed by the emergence of political and institutional 
demands and claims. In fact, as a good deal of research on the question of the appeal of 
imaginative appeal  and meanings of Englishness attests, questions of recognition, as well as 
representation and governance, are at the heart of the resurgence of this form of identity. 
Indeed the impulse to express, celebrate and evoke a national tradition and sense of identity 
in cultural terms has been a preamble and accompaniment to the growing political focus upon 
English identity (Kenny 2014a, pp.131-170). A policy agenda responding to these trends 
might, therefore, involve various kinds of cultural provision, changes to the ways in which 
the nationhood of the English is depicted in terms of flags and symbols, and a different 
response to the growing demand for historical narratives and public representations of 
nationhood which pick out English, as well as British, lineages. 
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The fourth, and final, characterisation offered here also carries implications for politics and 
policy. Framing Englishness as a pathological product of the UK’s decline inclines politicians 
and citizens alike to perceive it as a regressive and insular form of identity –a retreat from the 
dilemmas and challenges of the modern world and the wider entanglements and alliances to 
which England has belonged. Such a form of understanding suggests that this species of 
‘narrow nationalism’ needs to be contained, and its potential impact upon the working classes, 
in particular, negated through the cultivation of alternative ideas about universal rights and 
liberal values. Little space is left in such an understanding for the possibility that the 
emphasis upon an English demos might engender or sustain democratic demands of various 
kinds.  Viewing Englishness as an alienated and chauvinistic form of self-assertion inevitably 
inhibits the prospects of positive and democratic engagement with its sentiments and 
manifestations, and has had the consequence of leaving it to the political right to appropriate 
and control the narratives and cultural resources associated with what was once widely 
assumed to be a deeply liberal model of nationality. 
Conclusions 
In this article I have argued the case for identifying several distinct modes of understanding 
‘political Englishness’, and pointed to some of the actual and potential policy directions 
which are likely to flow from each of these. I lack the space here to offer a fully-fledged 
alternative framework that encompasses their strengths and removes their weaknesses. But it 
is possible to identify some of the different elements that would provide the basis for a more 
comprehensive and balanced framework for understanding the issues at stake here. And these 
can be adduced through reference to the inadequacies and limitations of each of the 
perspectives considered above.  
Against the tendency to read Englishness as inherently conservative, there is a good case for 
regarding this form of identity as more polysemic in terms of the variety of different political 
narratives and ideas that can be promoted through its articulation. Second, rather than 
positing this as an issue-area that has been created and controlled by actors in the party 
system, there is a good case for political science to engage much more deeply, using different 
research methodologies and kinds of data, with the complexities of shifting forms of 
territorial identification among the English. 
Third, there is a strong argument that the cultural dimension and dynamics through which an 
English identity has been expressed, explored and normalised, have been unduly neglected by 
political scientists. And this has left commentators insensitive to the cultural dimensions of an 
emergent English nationalism, and to the nature and strength of the demands for recognition, 
as well as representation, in the political and governing systems associated with it. And, 
fourthly, there are good reasons to suggest that the post-imperial dilemma has been 
misconceived, and the possibility that different kinds of English identity might enable the 
strikingly diverse populace to navigate towards a new form of imagined community, 
accordingly overlooked. A framework forged around these blended elements is much more 
likely, I would contend, to help us capture the ideological contestability, cultural resonances 
and political implications of Englishness, and to comprehend its increasingly salient role in 
public discourse and political life.  
  
9 
 
References 
Brown, G. (2015) My Scotland, Our Britain: a Future Worth Sharing (London: Simon & 
Schuster). 
Cowley, P. and D.Kavanagh (2015) The British General Election of 2015 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan). 
Crick, B. (1993) ‘Review of Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1701-1837 and Roy 
Porter (ed) Myths of the English’, Political Quarterly, 64, 2. 
Gamble, A. (1994) Britain in Decline (Basingstoke: Macmillan). 
Gamble, A. (2003) Between Europe and America: the Future of British Politics (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave).  
Gifford, C. (2014) The Making of Eurosceptic Britain (London: Ashgate, 2014). 
Gilroy, P. (2004) After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture? (London: Routledge). 
Green, J. (2015) ‘Learning the right lessons from Labour’s 2015 defeat’, Juncture; available 
at: http://www.ippr.org/juncture/learning-the-right-lessons-from-labours-2015-defeat 
Howe, S. (2013) ‘Internal Decolonization? British Politics since Thatcher as Post-Colonial 
Trauma’, Twentieth Century British History, 14, 3, 2003, 286-304. 
Jeffery, C., R.Wyn Jones, A.Henderson, R.Scully and G.Lodge (2014) Taking England 
Seriously: The New English Politics; The Future of England Survey 2014; available at: 
http://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/wgc/files/2014/10/Taking-England-Seriously_The-New-English-
Politics.pdf 
 
Jones, O. (2012) ‘The Incoherence of Englishness; and why Ed Miliband’s England is a Lost 
Country’, The Independent, 8 June. 
Kenny, M. (2014a) The Politics of English Nationhood (Oxford: Oxford University Press).  
Kenny, M. (2014b) ‘“A Traditional English (Not British) Country Gentleman of the Radical 
Left”; Understanding the Making and Unmaking of Edward Thompson’s English 
Idiom’,  Contemporary British History, 28, 4, 494-516. 
Kumar, K. (1999) The Making of English National Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
Mandler, P. (2007) The English National Character: the History of an Idea from Edmund 
Burke to Tony Blair (Yale, NH: Yale University Press).  
Mann, R. (2011) ‘“It Just Feels English Rather than Multicultural”: Local Interpretations of 
Englishness and non-Englishness’, Sociological Review, 59, 1, 109-28. 
McKay Commission (2013) Commission on the consequences of devolution for the House of 
Commons; available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130403030652/http:/tmc.independent.gov.uk/ 
 
10 
 
Miller, D. (1995) On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press).  
Nairn, T. (1977) The Break-up of Britain (London: New Left Books).  
Nairn, T. (2000) After Britain: New Labour and the Return of Scotland (London: Verso). 
Nairn, T, (2011) The Enchanted Glass: Britain and its Monarchy (London: Verso). 
Ormston, R. (2012) The English Question: How is England Responding to Devolution? 
(London: NatCen, 2012); available at: http://www.natcen.ac.uk/media/816007/the-english-
question-final.pdf. 
Schofield, C. (2013) Enoch Powell and the Making of Postcolonial Britain (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Seth Smith, N. (2013) ‘UKIP and the Rise of English Nationalism’, Open Democracy, 17 
July; available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/niki-seth-smith/ukip-and-
rise-of-english-nationalism 
Skey, M. (2011) National Belonging and Everyday Life (London: Palgrave). 
Thompson, E.P. (1965) ‘Peculiarities of the English’, Socialist Register, 311-62. 
Tombs, R. (2014) The English and their History (London: Allen Lane). 
Tombs, R. (2015) ‘What Does England Want?’, New Statesman, 28 April. 
White, M. (2015) ‘Britain's election: rise of Scottish and English nationalists threatens old 
order’, The Guardian, 7 April.  
 
Wyn Jones, R. G.Lodge, A.Henderson and D.Wincott, The Dog that Finally Barked: England 
as an Emerging Political Community (London: IPPR, 2012). 
Wyn Jones, R., G.Lodge, C.Jeffery, G.Gottfried, R.Scully, A.Henderson, and D.Wincott 
(2013) England and its Two Unions; the Anatomy of a Nation and its Discontents (London: 
IPPR). 
                                                          
i Some psephologists (Green 2015) argue against the idea that this factor was important in the election outcome, 
though many political commentators and practitioners disagree (see Cowley and Kavanagh 2015). 
ii  Early versions of the papers in this issue were all first delivered at a one-day conference, sponsored by the 
Political Studies Association, at the University of Huddersfield on 7th April 2015.   
